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I want to start this talk by drawing your attention to an experiment that asks participants to watch 
a short video featuring two teams of three. One 
team is dressed in all white, the other in all black. 
Players on both teams pass basketballs to one 
another as quickly as they can. Viewers are asked 
to count only the passes between members of the 
team wearing white. After intensely watching the 
video and reporting the number of passes they 
counted, the video is rewound and viewers are 
asked to watch it once again, this time without 
counting or looking for anything in particular. On 
the second viewing, they see a man dressed in a 
gorilla suit walk slowly through the center of the 
frame, pause to do a dance, then walk slowly off 
camera. Most participants are amazed that they 
did not see the gorilla the first time and assume 
that they have been tricked, but they haven’t.
 Psychologists call  this phenomenon 
inattentional blindness. The main point of the 
experiment is that we see what we are told to 
see, not necessarily what is actually before our 
eyes. Historians have treated nationalism in ways 
similar to those in which participants in the 
experiment have treated the basketball players 
– as the things they are supposed to see first. 
What I’d like to suggest in my time here tonight 
is that we have spent so much effort seeing World 
War I as an expression of nationalism that we 
have all but ignored the gorilla, which, if you’ll 
permit me to stretch this analogy even further, 
represents the many other ways men identified 
themselves.
 The national model is the easiest and most 
natural and I do not mean to discard it entirely 
or pretend that nationalism was not important. 
Nationalism was potent stuff to the men of 1914 
and so it has remained to historians ever since. 
If I needed any more reminders of this fact, I 
got them in conferences last year in Israel and 
Australia. The first conference was surprisingly 
(and, I might add, quite refreshingly) devoid of 
any discussion of the Somme, Verdun, Douglas 
Haig, or Kaiser Wilhelm II. Instead, it centered 
around the actions of Djemal Pasha, Aaron 
Aaronson, and an intense debate about exactly 
what percentage of Arabs joined the 1916 revolt 
against the Ottoman Empire. That debate had 
little to do with history and everything to do with 
the political persuasions of the antagonists. To 
cite another example, a man came up to me in 
Canberra to tell me that he had enjoyed my book 
Fighting the Great War, but did not understand 
how I could pretend to write a global history of the 
war (in just 100,000 words, mind you) without 
making reference to the accomplishments of the 
British 62nd Division, raised in his native region. 
If the old expression that all politics is local is 
true, then it is equally true that all history (or at 
least historical memory) is local as well.
 The influential state-funded official national 
histories written shortly after the war, the national 
museums (like the excellent Canadian War 
Museum in Ottawa), and the national nature of 
most war memorials have cemented the national 
memory of the wartime experience at center 
stage. The war has become a formative event in 
the histories and collective memories of nation-
states, as I need not remind those of you sitting 
here tonight. Many, dare I say most, Canadians 
will easily and naturally point to Vimy Ridge as 
the place where Canada “became a nation,” even 
if they cannot tell Arthur Currie from Robert 
Michael S. Neiberg delivered the keynote address at the 19th Military History Colloquium, held 
at the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, 1-3 May 2008. This is the text of his address.
Toward a Transnational 
History of World War I
Michael S. Neiberg
Neiberg - Transnational History of WW1.indd   31 03/09/2008   1:26:02 PM
1
Neiberg: Transnational History of WWI
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008
32
Borden. In the words of one recent popular 
study, Vimy was the first “awakening of that full 
sense of [Canadian] nationhood,” and that image 
might well be the war’s most important legacy for 
Canadians.1 In a similar vein, as I was constantly 
reminded in Canberra, Australians and New 
Zealanders still point to Gallipoli as the birth 
pangs of their nation, as the celebrations just 
last week commemorating Anzac Day continue to 
show. That Australia lost many more men on the 
Somme and at Passchendaele is an inconvenient 
fact of history that runs counter to the national 
story, and is thus frequently forgotten. Even in 
places with a presumably more developed sense 
of national identity, the war serves for many as 
a watershed between the dominance of local 
identity and the dominance of national identity, 
as the arguments of David Kennedy for the United 
States and Eugen Weber for France demonstrate.2 
Men went to war wearing national uniforms and 
marching under national flags, so the national 
model has somewhat naturally come to dominate 
discourse on the war.
 But here tonight I’d like to ask you, just 
for a moment, to turn your gaze away from the 
national narratives that have dominated our 
understandings of this war and instead see the 
wider European world as a place where men 
and women shared much in common. Social 
class, regional loyalties, generational differences, 
gender, political affiliation, and religion (to name 
just a few) were identifications that transcended 
national borders, even if they impacted different 
parts of the European world in different ways.
 The phrase “European world” is meant 
to include those parts of the world that still 
retained significant political, social, economic, 
and cultural attachments to the Old World. Also 
sometimes known as the “settler colonies,” these 
places shared in the general development of 
European civilization and many of their residents 
clearly understood themselves as Europeans first 
and foremost. This world included Australians, 
New Zealanders, South Africans, Algerians, 
and, of course, Canadians. To take Canada as 
an example of this process, only 30 percent of 
Canadians who went to war in 1914 were born 
in Canada. The vast majority of the rest had been 
born in Britain. First-generation immigrants 
made up half of the Canadian Army as late as 
National history is the easiest and most common approach when studying the First World War, but a transnational approach 
may offer new and different perspectives on the war.  Clockwise, from left: A Canadian tank commander applies a maple 
leaf to the front of his vehicle before the start of the Amiens offensive, August 1918; A German machine gun crew on the 
Western Front; A studio portrait of a French ofﬁcer; British troops mass before an attack at Gallipoli.
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1917, even though only 23 percent of Canadians 
were foreign-born in that year. To cite another 
example, more than 36,000 of the men who 
volunteered to serve in Australian units in 1914 
were born in the British Isles. This amounts to 
more than one in five. Such men are the most 
visible and tangible linkages between the old 
world and the new and they serve as a reminder 
of the permeability of the borders between the 
two. 
 So much of the discussion of Australia’s 
and Canada’s history of the war has centered 
around the extent to which the war made those 
places a “nation,” however defined. But what 
would happen if we saw Australia and Canada 
not as places in some debatable stage of national 
development, but as parts of a much wider world 
with a shared culture, a shared economic market, 
and a shared global outlook?
 Let me be clear: I certainly do not mean to 
suggest that nationalism was not important. Nor 
do I mean to suggest that all nations fought for the 
same goals or that all nations were equally on the 
side of the right. This is not an exercise in moral 
relativism. Rather, it is an attempt to understand 
the European world that produced this war in 
all of its multi-layered complexities. Canadians 
may or may not have gone off to war identifying 
themselves as “Canadians” or as “Britons,” but 
they certainly went to war as much more. They 
went as Ontarians or Québécois, as farmers or 
wage laborers, as Protestants or Catholics, as 
parents, as children, as husbands, as brothers. In 
this, of course, Canadians had much in common 
not only with the people they fought alongside, 
but with the people they fought against as well.
 Such a vision of the war would require 
historians to get beyond the traditional 
comparative method, which juxtaposes two or 
three subjects in order to discover what is truly 
unique about one of them. This method has 
its utility for studying war because the objects 
of comparison actually do compete with one 
another in the existential arena of the battlefield, 
allowing historians to study the result and debate 
the causes of victory and defeat. But the object 
of such analyses is still to identify (and in many 
cases to celebrate) national differences. As long 
as that remains the goal we will come no closer to 
the development of a truly global understanding 
of what was, after all, a truly global war.
 The need to see a world war in truly global 
terms has led me away from comparative history 
and toward a new and potentially fruitful method 
of historical analysis known as transnationalism. 
I am certainly not arguing against national or 
regional history. Rather, I am suggesting that 
we may benefit from this new methodology by 
placing national and regional studies into a wider 
and broader context. The central idea of what 
some historians call “the transnational turn” in 
historical analysis is to examine processes and 
movements that migrate easily across national 
borders and are generally unaffected by the 
actions of governments. In the words of one 
recent article on transnationalism, the method:
examines units that spill over and seep through 
national borders, units both greater and smaller 
than the nation-state.…Perhaps the core of 
transnational history is the challenge it poses 
to the hermeneutic preeminence of nations. 
Without losing sight of the “potent forces” 
nations have become…transnational history 
treats the nation as one among a range of social 
phenomena to be studied, rather than the frame 
of the study itself.3
 Some of the pioneering work in transnational 
history came in studying environmental history, 
intellectual history, and gender history. To date, 
historians of warfare have been less interested 
in this methodology, perhaps because war is in 
itself an inherently governmental activity. I would 
submit to you, however, that transnationalism 
might be better suited to the study of war than 
many of the areas to which it has already been 
applied. Militarism, pacifism, industrialization, 
military professionalism, and imperialism are 
just a few of the transnational phenomena that 
impacted the entire European world, often without 
governments getting involved. A transnational 
view of the road to war would surely correct 
the image of a continent irreparably divided 
by national and alliance rivalries. It might also 
help us see instead the many ways that people 
identified themselves beyond national rivalry.
 Numerous commentators in 1913 and 
the first half of 1914, for example, noted how 
close relations were between the English and 
the Germans at almost every level except the 
governmental. The very concepts of “British” 
and “German,” were, of course, still being 
worked out. Harry Steurmer, a German Catholic 
from Baden, loved the English, but decried the 
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“Prussian spirit of unbounded exaggeration of 
self and deprecation of others” that he feared 
would sooner or later bring the English and the 
Germans to war unnecessarily.4 Indeed there 
is little evidence to suggest a hatred or even a 
suspicion between the two peoples sufficient to 
lead them to war. Shortly after the assassination 
of archduke Franz Ferdinand, a British fleet made 
a friendly visit to a German fleet at Kiel and in 
London Liberal MP Arnold Stephenson Rowntree 
saw nothing unusual in his hosting 30 German 
students at his social club even as the July Crisis 
was reaching its boiling point.5 Even in France, 
men who lived far from the “lost territories” of 
Alsace and Lorraine or who were born well after 
their loss in 1871, saw the issue quite differently 
than did the nationalists in Paris who screamed 
for revanche. One German diplomat noted after 
a tour of the French countryside in 1913 that “no 
one is disposed to risk his or his sons” necks 
for the question of Alsace-Lorraine.”6 Similarly, 
an American who toured Alsace and Lorraine 
in 1913 concluded that the spirit of revanche 
had “slowly waned as the new generations have 
come and gone.” He saw “no real hatred” between 
Frenchmen and Germans and believed that the 
two sides would eventually reach an entente 
across the Rhine as naturally as the French and 
English had done across the English Channel. In 
this way, all the bitter hatreds of western Europe 
could be buried.7
 All of the above would seem to suggest that 
an over reliance on the national model rides 
roughshod over much complexity and subtlety. 
By focusing on nationalism to the exclusion of 
other factors, we may be seeing only part of the 
picture in a kind of historiographical version 
of inattentional blindness. In the second half of 
my talk here tonight, let me present three brief 
examples of how a transnational approach to 
the study of the war might help us to see the 
years 1914-1918 in a more complex manner. 
First, a transnational approach would help us 
understand that men went to war for a wide 
variety of principles that they believed in deeply. 
For some men these were nationalist in origin, 
but other transnational motivations were mixed 
in as well. Some of these were political and 
class-based. The classic example of such a 
transnational movement in the years before the 
war was the international socialist movement. 
As early as 1891 socialists across Europe had 
begun to discuss the possibility of stopping a 
continental war by declaring a general strike. 
Of course, they were aware of the dilemma that 
the International Socialist Congress considered 
in 1893 in Zurich, namely that a general strike 
might “put the country where socialists were 
most powerful at the mercy of the country where 
socialism, as a movement, was most backward.” 
Nevertheless, by 1907 the International Socialist 
Congress had agreed on the general strike as the 
best means to prevent a war.8
 Indeed, the socialist parties across Europe 
congratulated themselves on having used the 
mere threat of a general strike to contain and 
localize the two Balkan Wars. Whether they had, 
in fact, is another question. The important point 
is that they believed that they had. They therefore 
approached the crisis of 1914 believing that they 
could once again work together to contain a 
Balkan crisis. The famous meeting of European 
socialists in Brussels on July 28 now seems to us 
to have been a last, hopeless gasp to avoid a global 
catastrophe. But the men and women at that 
meeting did not see it that way. They believed that 
they still had time to force their governments to 
their senses. One of the delegates at that meeting, 
French socialist leader Jean Jaurès, reminded a 
Belgian colleague of a crisis in Morocco in 1911 
that had blown over, “This is going to be another 
Agadir. We shall have ups and downs. But this 
crisis will be resolved like the others.”9 Socialists 
from across Europe left Brussels planning to 
meet again in Paris on August 9, to be followed 
by a meeting in Vienna. There would be time, 
they believed, to use international arbitration to 
avoid a catastrophe. For their part, the German 
delegates assured their French comrades that 
Germany would not be so foolish as to go to war 
for “a Habsburg whim.”10
 Of course, Jaurès and his colleagues did not 
know just how far the decisions of the diplomats 
and the generals had already gone. Jaurès’s 
warning as late as July 28 that the workers of 
Europe “must rally the forces for good, the forces 
of progress” against “the flood of barbarism” 
went unheeded and within a week he was dead 
at a French assassin’s hand.11 It was the second 
shocking assassination in Europe in as many 
months, and to most working-class people across 
Europe it was by far the more tragic. War began 
a few short days later amid a renewed rise of 
national passions. But we should not assume, 
as too many historians have facilely done, that 
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Europeans immediately forgot their principles 
as soon as the guns began to fire. On August 
4, the German socialist party voted in favor of 
credits for the war, a step historians have taken 
as an indication of their willingness to put their 
nationalism above their ideology. But listen 
to a few excerpts from the words the German 
socialists pronounced in casting their votes:
This is a fateful hour.…The responsibility for this 
disaster falls upon those who have inaugurated 
and supported that policy. We refuse to accept any 
such responsibility.…Up to the very last hours 
we have worked for the preservation of peace, 
in especially close cooperation with our French 
brethren.…We condemn all wars of conquest. We 
demand that, as soon as our safety is assured 
the war be terminated by a peace which makes 
friendly relations with our neighbor countries 
possible. We hope that the cruel lesson of war 
will arouse in many more millions of people a 
horror of war and will convert them to the ideals 
of socialism. Guided by these considerations, we 
vote for the war appropriations.12
 Even under the tide of national ardor ran 
currents that were both counter to the mood 
of nationalism and consistent with it. Across 
the Rhine, French socialists believed that their 
German brethren had made the war possible by 
refusing to honor the agreement not to go to war. 
French socialist Léon Werth therefore went to war 
to fight not just against the German government, 
but against traitorous German socialists whom 
he blamed for making the war possible by their 
refusal to honor the international socialist 
demand for a general strike. France, led in Werth’s 
mind by its socialists, would have to defeat the 
German Army in order “to impose [a socialist] 
peace on the world.”13 Wirth was fighting not for 
France – or maybe it’s more accurate to say not 
just for France – but for a vision of a fairer and 
more just socialist post-war world, a vision that 
he shared, ironically enough, with thousands of 
men on the other side of the lines.
 Nor was it only socialism that could inspire 
men across national boundaries. Irish Nationalist 
Tom Kettle, killed on the Somme in 1916 while 
serving with the Dublin Fusiliers, serves as 
another example. Ironically, the British Army 
(more importantly to Kettle the Irish regiment 
that was a component of that army) was the 
chosen vehicle of this Irish Nationalist for the 
attainment of universal European principles. 
Although he had little love for Great Britain, 
Kettle saw no choice for Ireland but to fight for 
the cause of justice and for the cause of Europe, 
which he wrote “carried the fortunes and hopes 
of all mankind,” but was threatened by German 
barbarity. He saw the contradiction and irony in 
enlisting in the British Army, but he did so, in 
his mind, not as a Briton, an identity he rejected 
even as he enlisted in the British Army, but as 
a European, a Christian, and an Irishman. In 
his mind he was going to war as a “international 
nationalist,” an Irishman in the service of Europe 
and mankind.14
 Together these examples help us to understand 
that men went to war in 1914 for a wide variety of 
ideals they believed in. We can therefore reject the 
persistent image of innocent “lambs being led to 
slaughter.” We can also reject an understanding of 
the outbreak of the war as the exclusive result of 
an excess of national passions. Nationalism there 
surely was, but the passions, the enthusiasms, 
and the resigned determinations of men in 1914 
came from much more. They came from the 
dizzyingly complex nature of European society, 
a place where nationalism was but one among 
many ideologies with calls to the loyalties of men 
and women across the continent, loyalties for 
which they were willing to fight and die.
 Second, and perhaps more interesting, 
a transnational approach might help us to 
understand why men stayed in the trenches and 
why they endured the horrid conditions of the 
western front. There was only one major refusal 
to fight before the war’s final weeks, and it 
occurred in France in the wake of the disastrous 
1917 Nivelle Offensive. But even the mutineers on 
French troops resting in a trench.
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the Chemin des Dames were careful not to allow 
the Germans to take advantage of what French 
headquarters called their “acts of collective 
indiscipline.” French soldiers were aware that an 
ensuing German victory would destroy the chance 
at seeing their war goals fulfilled, whatever those 
goals might have been. Notably, the demands of 
the men were varied and diverse. Some wanted 
political change, some wanted economic reform, 
and some sought fundamental changes to the very 
nature of French society. Some patriotically sang 
La Marseillaise, others the Internationale, and 
some sang both. Other soldiers in other armies, 
most notably men from underrepresented 
minority groups or oppositional political groups, 
had similar concerns, although they rarely 
expressed them in quite the same way. Seen 
in a new light, these mutinies are therefore not 
an exclusively French phenomenon, which the 
comparative method might suggest, but only the 
most extreme manifestation of a series of soldier 
grievances whose origins can be traced back to 
the pre-war years.
 This transnational turn might also help 
us to understand the many complexities and 
contradictions the war brought to the surface. 
For example, Irish Republicans and Ulster 
Unionists, both of whom were ready to take 
up arms against Britain during the Home Rule 
controversy, nevertheless volunteered to serve 
Britain, albeit in distinct local units with clear 
confessional identities. Similarly, socialists in 
all nations, who had railed against the power of 
capitalists, nevertheless joined the colors and 
paradoxically protected the very system they 
had decried. If we understand this seemingly 
contradictory military service not as a function 
Above: Soldiers from the French 157th Infantry Regiment 
pose for group photograph.
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of coercion or naïveté or the release of a pent 
up subconscious nationalism, but as a function 
of their desire to fight for their own goals, then 
their experiences come into sharper focus. So, 
too, does their commitment to seeing the war to 
a successful conclusion and the widespread post-
war disillusionment, even among the ostensible 
victors. Indeed this shared disillusionment seems 
all the more sensible when seen in a transnational 
light: France and England may have won the 
war as nation-states, but the rights of national 
minorities like the Irish and the dream of a 
socialist Europe clearly had not.
 Which brings me to my final point: the 
shared sense of disappointment with the post-
war peace agreements might become more 
clear if seen as a transnational phenomenon. 
It was not just that Frenchmen, Germans, and 
Canadians did not get from the war what they 
thought they deserved. It was also that socialists, 
Irish separatists, and industrial workers felt 
that the war had left them worse off than before, 
despite their massive sacrifices. Accordingly, 
they responded in transnational ways, putting 
their faith in international bodies like the League 
of Nations, or by joining transnational political 
movements like communism and fascism. To be 
sure, French fascism was not quite the same as 
German fascism, but a transnational turn might 
help us to see similarity where we have to date 
mostly looked for difference. Maybe then we can 
develop a fuller understanding of a war that was, 
in the end, a shared, transnational experience.
 “This,” F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote about the 
multi-national Battle of the Somme, “took 
religion and years of plenty and tremendous 
sureties and the exact relation that existed 
between the classes.…You had to remember 
Christmas, and postcards of the Crown Prince 
and his fiancée, and little cafés in Valence and 
beer gardens in Unter den Linden and weddings 
at the mairie, and going to the Derby, and your 
grandfather’s whiskers.”15 One couldn’t ask for 
a better transnational explanation of the shared 
experiences of Europeans from 1914 to 1918, 
and it came from a member of that eccentric 
and secessionist part of the European world, the 
United States.
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